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No Easy Walk: Advancing Refugee 
Protection in South Africa
Jeff Handmaker
South Africa only began accepting individual applications 
for political asylum in 1994. A policy designed to recognize 
former Mozambican refugees for the purposes of a repa-
triation program became the (awkward) basis of the asylum 
procedure up until April 2000. Criticized by some, a lively 
discussion raising often-contradictory views began in 1996, 
leading to a policy reform process culminating in the Refu-
gees Act in December 1998. The Act only came into force 
at the beginning of April 2000. This article analyzes the 
process of policy development in South Africa, focusing on 
practical and theoretical challenges facing the government 
in the implementation of the new Act. Special attention is 
given to temporary protection, the proposed containment 
of applicants in reception centers, the arbitrary manner in 
which asylum is currently determined, and inconsistencies 
between the interfacing of the Refugees Act and the proposed 
immigration legislation. The paper concludes by asserting 
that the new legislation can be effective, but only if the gov-
ernment builds capacity, and if the procedure allows a fair 
opportunity for asylum applicants to be granted a credible 
hearing.
As the title of this essay suggests, it has been “no easy walk” ensuring 
adequate protection for refugees in South Africa. By all accounts this is 
a “walk” far from fi nished. While South Africa has certainly not been a 
stranger to refugee movements, particularly in its pre-1994 history, it only 
recently established an asylum determination regime to assess applications 
for refugee status on an individual basis. The development of a workable 
structure for administering the regime has been complicated by a number 
of factors, both policy- and capacity-related.
South Africa’s policy on refugees has its origins in the country’s 
much-criticized Aliens Control Act (96 of 1991) (ACA), which in numerous 
respects has failed to provide adequate guarantees to applicants (Human 
Rights Watch 1998:170; Handmaker 1999a, 1999b). Until the recent imple-
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mentation of its fi rst-ever Refugees Act (Act 130 of 1998) in April 2000, 
South Africa’s policy on refugees depended on the ACA, with the Depart-
ment of Home Affairs responsible for enforcement.1 The ACA is an omnibus 
piece of legislation, with its origins in British colonial policies of the early 
twentieth century designed to restrict the number of immigrants to the 
Union, especially from India (Peberdy and Crush 1998). The contents and 
implementation of this Act have been roundly criticized, and its constitu-
tionality seriously questioned (Klaaren 1996, 1998; Crush 1998; Klaaren 
and Sprigman 2000).
The asylum system has always fi t quite uncomfortably within the 
country’s heavily criticized immigration regime (Klaaren and Sprigman 
2000). There are not enough resources (especially staff) on hand to pro-
cess the steadily increasing numbers of asylum applications. The number 
of applications appears to have stabilized in recent years and cannot be 
regarded as presenting a situation of “mass infl ux,” compared with other 
countries on the continent (Handmaker 1999a:290). However limited the 
number of staff, the majority of whom urgently need training, makes for a 
cumbersome system which has consistently failed to achieve satisfactory 
standards of administrative justice (Klaaren 1996; Kerfoot 2001).
This essay examines the process of refugee policy reform that began 
in 1996. This process led to the country’s fi rst-ever Refugees Act in 1998. 
The Act’s accompanying regulations were only released one and a half years 
later in April 2000. More recently, the Chairperson of the Refugee Appeals 
Board released the fi rst “Draft Rules” in June 2000, and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs proposed a Refugees Amendment Bill and accompanying 
explanatory Memorandum in 2001.2
This policy process has been extremely controversial, both in its 
making and in the fi nal product, and it would be impossible to cover all 
aspects of this in a single essay (but see Handmaker, de la Hunt, and Klaaren 
2001). This article focuses instead on several particularly contentious issues, 
notably temporary protection, repatriation, the proposal for containment of 
refugees in “reception centers,” the arbitrariness of the refugee procedure 
as it currently operates, and confl icts between the new refugee regime and 
proposed migration policies.
Refugee Movements to South Africa
While South Africa has only recently developed a policy on refugees and 
asylum, it has certainly been no stranger to displacement, generating and 
receiving substantial numbers of forcibly displaced persons in its history. 
One group of refugees consisted of those who fl ed South Africa as a con-
sequence of persecution by the apartheid government. They lived in exile 
mainly in neighboring countries, but also further afi eld. A second group 
consisted of Mozambican refugees, victims of a destabilization campaign 
(economic as well as military) by South Africa, which directly resulted in 
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the civil war in that country (Human Rights Watch 1998:24). These dis-
placed persons settled (illegally) in the former “homeland” areas of South 
Africa (in particular Gazankulu and Kingwane). En route they faced great 
physical risks that included a lethal electric fence, heavily armed soldiers, 
and a wildlife reserve fi lled with dangerous animals (Human Rights Watch 
1998:29).
After years of being systematically turned away, the UNHCR was 
fi nally permitted to establish a presence in South Africa in 1991. Once it 
gained a mandate to operate in South Africa, the UNHCR began address-
ing “durable solutions” for both the returning South African exiles, and an 
estimated 300,000 Mozambicans who had fl ed the civil war in their country, 
but had never been formally recognized by the South African government. 
While the return of exiles involved a burdensome program of reintegration, 
concerning in many cases the re-acquiring of South African citizenship, 
the problems facing the former Mozambican refugees proved to be even 
more complex.
To implement the program for former Mozambican refugees, the 
UNHCR facilitated the establishment of a tripartite commission, in coop-
eration with the governments of South Africa (represented by the Depart-
ment of Home Affairs) and Mozambique (Handmaker 1999a: 293). This 
Commission recommended two “solutions.” The fi rst was for a repatriation 
program, to be implemented in terms of a “Tripartite Agreement” between 
the two governments and the UNHCR. This program was carried out under 
the auspices of the UNHCR as the coordinating agency. The second recom-
mendation was for “regularized status” to be granted to the former Mozam-
bican refugees. Approval for this program was fi nally granted by the South 
African cabinet in 1996. After extended delays, implementation began under 
somewhat controversial circumstances in February 2000 (Handmaker and 
Schneider 2002).
As the Mozambicans had never formally been recognized as refugees, 
it was necessary for them to be retrospectively “recognized” for the purposes 
of the time-limited repatriation program. Legal recognition was achieved 
through a basic determination procedure that was contained in Passport 
Control Instruction No. 20 of 1993, issued in terms of the Aliens Control 
Act. This procedure for establishing the refugee status of Mozambicans laid 
the basis for Passport Control Instruction No. 63 of 1994 which, together 
with other instructions and a “Basic Agreement” signed by UNHCR and 
South Africa, became the basis of South Africa’s pre-1998 refugee policy 
(Handmaker 1999a:292–303).
The repatriation program failed to meet its own, modest goals (Dolan 
1995), and was said by some to be the consequence of a “limited understand-
ing of the pattern of refugees’ own fl ight and return movements” (Wilson and 
Nunes 1994). The failure of the repatriation program to provide a “durable 
solution” to the majority of Mozambican refugees meant that they ended up 
once again in a “legal limbo.” At the time the cessation clause for Mozambi-
can refugees was put in place on 31 December 1998, this group was thought 
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to comprise a signifi cant proportion of the undocumented migrants living 
in South Africa (Human Rights Watch 1998:26).
Refugee movement to South Africa post-1990 has taken on a different 
character to the “mass infl ux” previously seen from Mozambique. Not long 
after the South African government introduced asylum determination pro-
cedures for individual applicants in 1993, a “trickle” of applicants began to 
arrive. The fl ow increased steadily between 1995 and 1998, later leveling off 
at approximately 20,000 per year (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Asylum-seekers 
have come primarily from nearby countries such as Angola, and also from 
the Great Lakes area (Zaire [DRC], Burundi, and Rwanda) and the Horn 
(Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia). A smaller number have arrived from West 
African countries, mainly Nigeria and Senegal, though also Côte d’Ivoire, 
Cameroon, and other countries (see Table 2). A larger number of applicants 
have been arriving from India and Pakistan. In June 2000, they made up 
eighteen percent of the total applications received, and thirty-one percent 
of applicants rejected (see Table 3). Bearing in mind the current backlog, 
approved applications to date have overwhelmingly (eighty-eight percent) 
been from three countries perceived to be “refugee generating,” namely 
Somalia, Angola, and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (see Table 4).
While the reasons remain speculative, many in offi cial circles hold the 
view that the majority of applicants are bogus, and have accordingly intro-
duced a variety of restrictive policies. The latest of these policies restricts 
asylum-seekers from work or study. While there has undoubtedly been abuse 
of the system, the introduction of a “white list” has been resisted by NGOs 
who challenge the implicit assumption that any one country can be consid-
ered “safe,” particularly in relation to individuals targeted for persecution. 
Alternatively, there have been calls for an improvement in the effi ciency of 
the Department of Home Affairs’ management of the asylum determination 
procedure, which has so far led to incredibly long delays, and a substantial 
backlog in applications. In combination with a cumbersome, ineffi cient, 
and restrictive migration and immigration policy and implementation, this 
has led to a situation where migrants (many of whom are highly skilled) 
seek residence in South Africa through the asylum system, irrespective of 
whether they may be suffering persecution.
Toward a Refugee Act: From Control to Protection
The fi rst proposal to introduce refugee legislation came about in 1996, with 
the preparation of an initial Draft Refugee Bill by the Department of Home 
Affairs (DHA) (Al-Omari 1996). This was followed by the circulation of a 
Second Draft Bill which received substantial critical commentary (de la 
Hunt 1996; Hathaway 1996; McNamara and Morjane 1996), and was the 
subject of a workshop in November 1996, organized by Lawyers for Human 
Rights, the Wits Refugee Research Program, and the South African Human 
Rights Commission. Various refugee rights advocates, the UNHCR, law-
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yers, academics, and senior representatives of the Department of Home 
Affairs attended the workshop, held at the offi ces of the Commission.
Civil society was at this stage beginning to get organized, having 
formed Refugee Forums in the provinces, and a Refugee Rights Consortium 
to lobby at the national level. The DHA also showed itself, at the outset, to 
be open to criticism and debate3 by its circulation of proposed policy docu-
ments, participation in the November 1996 Workshop, and other meetings 
with civil society representatives. Following the November Workshop, 
however, the departmental process was subsequently put on hold, pending 
the appointment of a Task Team by the Minister of Home Affairs. The Task 
Team produced a Draft Green Paper on International Migration in May 1997 
(Republic of South Africa 1997). The Green Paper devoted a whole chapter 
to the refugee issue.
The Green Paper recommendations on refugee policy were heavily 
infl uenced by the work of the international Reformulation of Refugee Law 
Project.4 The proposals were commented on by various organizations and 
government departments, providing feedback from a wide range of perspec-
tives that raised a number of substantive concerns. Particular attention was 
focused on the Green Paper’s recommendations for temporary protection 
(discussed later in this article): its stated “solution-orientation” and propos-
als for “burden-sharing” within the region (UNHCR 1997; Rutinwa 1997; 
Handmaker 1998, 1999a:299–304; Handmaker, de la Hunt, and Klaaren 
2001).
The Green Paper also recommended separate policy processes for 
migration and refugees. Despite pressures from civil society and a major 
conference in August 1997 organized by the Southern African Migration 
Project and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, further 
progress was slow. This situation prompted Lawyers for Human Rights to 
organize a refugee policy conference in March 1998. Finally, in May 1998, 
the Department of Home Affairs appointed a Refugees White Paper Task 
Team.
The Task Team, which consisted of members from the Department, 
civil society and UNHCR, was provided with a Working Draft White Paper 
and Refugee Bill drafted by the DHA. This working draft of the bill closely 
resembled the problematic Second Draft Bill circulated in 1996, indicating 
that little progress had been made within the DHA in the interim. However, 
the White Paper Task Team was also under a mandate to draw reference from 
the recommendations of the Draft Green Paper, even though the government 
had made it clear in October 1997 that the document should only be consid-
ered for “discussion purposes.” In other words, the fi rst process (which began 
in 1996 with the fi rst Draft Refugee Bill) and the second process (beginning 
with the Green Paper) were fi nally consolidated into a single process.
A major difference at this stage in the policy process was that civil 
society organizations were now quite well organized. The National Con-
sortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA), a national network of South African 
NGOs (policy specialists, service providers, legal practitioners, and refugee 
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representatives) and representatives from UNHCR and government (includ-
ing the Border Police and the Department of Home Affairs) was founded in 
October 1997. By the time the Refugees White Paper Task Team was con-
stituted, the NCRA had established a “legal affairs subcommittee,” which 
organized at least two workshops and other, smaller meetings during the 
course of the Task Team’s meetings. Several Task Team members were from 
organizations represented on the NCRA. Thus, it was possible to engage a 
larger body of input to the policy process.
Based on the recommendations of the Task Team, the DHA presented 
the Refugees White Paper to the public in a relatively short space of time 
on 19 June 1998 (Republic of South Africa 1998). The Department received 
public submissions, and the Task Team met again to consider them and 
make further amendments and recommendations to the Draft White Paper 
and Refugees Bill. These in turn were presented to the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs. However, before the Committee 
received these documents, the State Law Advisors offi ce extensively revised 
the Draft Bill, making changes to the refugee defi nition (which originally 
had repeated that contained in the International Conventions) and provid-
ing a more restrictive approach to determination. Again, the NCRA made 
extensive submissions, including a document of “joint concerns,” presented 
to the Portfolio Committee in October of 1998.
The Portfolio Committee’s amendments to the Draft Bill eventually 
resulted in the Refugees Act being passed by a consensus of the National 
Assembly on 5 November 1998. Notwithstanding certain unresolved con-
cerns over its content, it was encouraging to note the broad-based political 
support for the Bill, and to witness a much-needed legislative change, prior 
to the 1999 general election. Following assent by the Council of Provinces 
on 20 November, the Bill became law when President Nelson Mandela gave 
his signature on 2 December 1998. However, enthusiasm over the new leg-
islation quickly turned to frustration, as the Act did not come immediately 
into force. Hence, the asylum determination regime continued to be admin-
istered in terms of the Aliens Control Act, with all of its accompanying 
problems (Klaaren 2000).
The Regulations to the Refugees Act were eventually issued by the 
Department of Home Affairs in April 2000. While the bringing into force 
of the Refugees Act was much welcomed, this was overshadowed by the 
contents of the Regulations themselves. These again raised concerns over 
implementation and the rights which refugees and refugee applicants ought 
to be entitled to, both during the course of the determination procedure, 
and following the granting of refugee status. The Refugee Appeals Board’s 
Draft Rules, released in June 2000 were less contentious.
The list of enduring concerns still challenging the adequacy of refugee 
protection in South Africa is extensive. While the South African govern-
ment deserves some praise for including a good representation of civil soci-
ety organizations in the Task Team, the NCRA proved itself very effective 
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in ensuring that many substantive policy concerns were addressed in the 
fi nal legislation. But other concerns remain high on the agenda.
Debates over Temporary Protection
Temporary protection is an issue that fi rst attracted major attention in the 
discussions around the Green Paper and has continued to generate critical 
debate, which has not always been very constructive, arising both out of 
conceptual misunderstanding and major differences in perspective. From 
the very beginning, there has been considerable political resistance in South 
Africa to refugee integration. The granting of refugee status has, since its 
inception, been temporary. Beginning with the former Mozambican refu-
gees, it has always proved much easier (politically) to justify a program for 
refugee repatriation than one regularizing their status and integrating them 
into the South African community (Handmaker and Schneider 2002). Fol-
lowing the Mozambican repatriation program, and with the introduction of 
asylum determination procedures on an individual basis in 1994, it became 
quite clear that the government was reluctant to grant a more permanent 
status to refugees (Handmaker 1999a:299). However, the Refugees Act pro-
vided (in Section 27c) that a refugee: “is entitled to apply for an immigration 
permit . . . after fi ve years’ continuous residence in the Republic from the 
date on which he or she was granted asylum, if the Standing Committee 
certifi es that he or she will remain a refugee indefi nitely.”
This provision has yet to be fully tested, and is likely to prove con-
troversial, not least because it is notoriously diffi cult to ascertain whether 
a refugee will remain so indefi nitely, though situations that lead to refugee 
status rarely resolve themselves within a period of fi ve years (Handmaker 
1998:7, 1997:967).
The Green Paper insisted that it did “not endorse an understanding 
of refugee protection as an alternative means to immigrate permanently to 
South Africa” (4.2.2). No commentator fundamentally disagreed with this 
statement. However, some maintained that, notwithstanding inevitable 
abuse of the procedure, attempts to stay integration in all cases until after 
fi ve years (given that a signifi cant number already experienced long delays 
in the determination procedure) would be inhumane. Furthermore, such 
a measure would be contrary to domestic and international human rights 
standards (Handmaker 1999a:301–2). Others, including Rutinwa (1997, 2001), 
more generally questioned the viability of the general model proposed by the 
Green Paper. He claimed that “its elements were infl uenced by the negative 
attitudes of western states towards refugees after the cold war.” Rutinwa 
further questioned whether the Green Paper was, as it maintained, “rights 
regarding” (Rutinwa 1997:16).
Advocates of the Green Paper model, including Barutciski (1998), 
argued that such concerns relied on “false” comparisons with the applica-
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tion of temporary protection in Europe, which he said was “characterized by 
the absence of individualized status determinations because they involved 
perceived mass infl ows. Protection was granted to groups deemed to require 
protection, rather than individuals determined to satisfy the criteria for 
refugee status” (Barutciski 1998: 713).
However, Barutciski’s description of temporary protection in Europe 
actually very closely describes how asylum determination procedures oper-
ate in practice in South Africa. Despite the limited number of applications 
received, the government nevertheless seems to believe that the country 
is experiencing a “mass infl ow,” and has expressed its desire to introduce 
reception centers (see below). The government’s concern appears to be 
related more to a seriously under-resourced department than anything else. 
Further, applications relating to individual persecution take many years to 
decide, and are often rejected on unsustainable grounds (Kerfoot 2000). It 
is now fairly well established that the large majority of positive decisions 
granting refugee status in South Africa are based either on assumptions of 
whether a country is “refugee generating” and falling within the broader 
OAU defi nition (van Beek 2001) or considered “safe.”5 Those involved with 
the Reformulation Project, which formed the basis of the model laid out 
in Chapter 4 of the Green Paper, maintain that there is no prohibition in 
the international refugee conventions against temporary protection, more 
particularly:
The temporary nature of the obligation to provide protection 
is most explicit in the permission the Convention grants 
states to revoke refugee status whenever there is effective and 
meaningful change in a refugee’s country of origin, such that 
the need for protection no longer exists. (Hathaway 1997b)
Barutciski (1998:705) alleges that arguing for the automatic integration 
of refugees is tantamount to advocating permanent residence for undocu-
mented migrants. In one respect, this allegation can be rejected on the 
grounds that to acknowledge abuse of the asylum procedure cannot justify 
restrictive measures against all asylum applicants (Handmaker 1999a:301). 
That aside, those determined to abuse asylum procedures are in any event 
rarely deterred by measures which aim to diminish “pull” factors through 
punitive measures, as opposed to measures which address “root causes” 
(Ghosh 1998:147). The justifi cation for this allegation perhaps stemmed 
from Barutciski’s later assertion that “limited rights apparently encourage 
a more liberal policy in situations of mass infl ow, while elaborate rights 
that may lead to integration tend to discourage governments from allowing 
refugees to access their territories” (Barutciski 1998:714).
However, the asylum determination procedure in South Africa and, 
indeed, the rule of law in general, has for some time operated in a climate 
where rights entitlement (particularly prior to 1994) has traditionally been 
quite limited, and indeed is constantly being tested. Yet the asylum pro-
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cedure has, by turns, become more and more restrictive. In other words, 
there has been no apparent “nexus” established in South Africa between a 
limited rights regime, and the liberalizing of asylum procedures. In fact, the 
primary issue that locally based commentators have been concerned with 
concerns the lack of basic administrative justice in the administration pro-
cedure itself (Klaaren 1996, 2000). In the absence of legal representation, it 
was urgently felt that the system needed to include adequate checks against 
administrative unfairness, since the consequences of a wrong decision in 
the procedure could very well amount to further persecution as rejected 
claimants were returned to their countries of origin (Kerfoot 2000).
A further argument put forward challenging the viability of “tempo-
rary protection” concerned the “psycho-social risk” to refugees, an aspect 
of protection that the Green Paper also acknowledged (Republic of South 
Africa 1997:4.6.7) but did not elaborate. In this sense, the period in which 
one’s status in a country was uncertain could itself give rise to concern. 
Psychologists have concluded that a prolonged period of uncertainty in one’s 
residential status can result in considerable psychosocial harm to refugees 
(Silove 1997).
In short, the question as to whether the Green Paper model of refu-
gee protection would realistically address the concerns over the fl aws in 
refugee protection in the existing system was seriously questioned on the 
grounds of existing administrative practice and human rights. While asylum 
determination in many crucial respects “mirrors” that of Europe, a major 
exception is that procedures in the north do tend to become more “visible” 
as they are more frequently challenged through the legal system. The reason 
for this is that applicants in the north are often granted legal representation, 
something which is nearly impossible in South Africa at the moment. From 
another perspective, some commentators rejected the temporary protection 
model proposed by the Green Paper, since it was clearly founded on the 
(unsustainable) assumption that protection for the duration of risk, followed 
by repatriation was necessarily the “best solution.”
It has been noted that “most refugee movements have tended to result 
in permanent exile of the displaced populations” (Rogge 1994). In recent 
years, the notion of repatriation as the “best solution” has been challenged, 
with some arguing that why refugees might want to return home is as 
important, if not more so, than how they return (Bakewell 1998). Others 
maintain that repatriations are often impossible to satisfactorily imple-
ment, since programs often ignore the causes which led to displacement 
in the fi rst place (Voutira 1998). Finally repatriations and migrant return 
programs are in many cases undertaken in circumstances where “condi-
tions of absolute safety” are seriously questioned (Handmaker 1997). Even 
the UNHCR, which is traditionally very much in favor of repatriation as a 
solution, has recently advocated in favor of local integration, particularly 
for “urban-based” refugees (Geddo 2001).
In short, it is no longer realistic to assume that repatriation or return is 
the ideal solution, though there may well be occasions in which repatriation 
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or return can be a viable solution, provided that programs are conducted in 
conditions of dignity and recognize certain practical obstacles (Handmaker 
1999b). Such programs ought to at least benefi t from past experience, recog-
nizing that “repatriation is anything but problem free” (Rogge 1994:22).
A Confl ict between “Reformulation” and Pragmatism?
The disagreement over temporary protection and repatriation might best 
be explained as a dispute between those who endorsed a “reformulated” 
approach to refugee protection, as refl ected in Chapter 4 of the Green Paper, 
and those who put forward pragmatic arguments grounded in the highly 
problematic local situation. Put another way, on one side there were those 
who advocated a model of refugee protection founded on an approach that it 
was better to liberalize refugee determination procedures, extending protec-
tion to a greater number of persons on a temporary basis (Hathaway 1997b 
and 2001; Barutciski 1998). On the other side, there were those who felt 
that the refugee procedure ought to be fi rmly rooted in the administrative 
and constitutional culture rapidly emerging in South Africa, and endorsed 
a “decentralized hearing-based system” (Klaaren and Sprigman 2000). This 
position was supported by others who felt strongly that the product of legis-
lation ought to recognize the special “historical context” in which asylum 
procedures have been created and implemented (Handmaker 1999a:308). 
Still others felt more strongly that the model contained in Chapter 4 was 
“unsuitable for adoption” because it was “not informed by the experience 
of the region” (Rutinwa 1997:2).
Arguably the two strongest commentators on the temporary protec-
tion issue in South Africa have been Professor Jim Hathaway, now at the 
University of Michigan, and Dr. Bonaventure Rutinwa of the Centre for 
Forced Migration at the University of Dar Es Salaam, both of whom played 
very important roles in formal discussions on the process of refugee policy 
reform.
In his paper delivered at the March 1998 Refugee Conference, organized 
by Lawyers for Human Rights in Pretoria, Professor Hathaway acknowl-
edged the concerns referred to above, by questioning whether temporary 
protection of refugees should be seen as a “threat or solution” (Hathaway 
2001). Hathaway argued in favor of a “decisive and practical reinvigoration 
of refugee law,” for a more collective and “solution oriented” approach, and 
a more deliberate distinction between immigration and refugee protection. 
Hathaway further argued that “the refugee protection system was never 
intended to be a mechanism that generates solutions, but is instead a pal-
liative regime that protects desperate people until and unless a fundamental 
change of circumstances makes it safe for them to go home.”
Arguing against “routine admission of all refugees to permanency,” 
Hathaway argued that such a view “holds refugees hostage to a major proj-
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ect of social transformation,” also stating that “the basic protective role of 
refugee protection should not be a captive” in debates over whether refugees 
ought to be entitled to permanent residence, which in South Africa he felt 
was “absolutist” in its orientation (Hathaway 2001). Hathaway felt that the 
model in Chapter 4 of the Green Paper was “seriously misunderstood.” Like 
Hathaway, Dr. Rutinwa also recognized the “crisis of the refugee protection 
regime,” but is of a different view when it comes to resolving it. Rutinwa 
argued at the March 1998 Policy Conference that the rights of refugees under 
temporary protection have differed considerably from state to state, though 
they clearly intend for refugees ultimately to be repatriated.
While acknowledging that the reformulation of refugee law project 
has made a “signifi cant contribution” to debates on refugee policy, Rutinwa 
objected to the grounds and assumptions on which the “reformulation 
model” is based (Rutinwa 2001). In particular, Rutinwa took issue with 
the proposal for “collectivized” solutions, maintaining that its relevance is 
confi ned to only a few areas where refugee fl ows are focused, and that states 
will only cooperate “if the cost of noncooperation [is] higher” (Koser, Walsh, 
and Black 1998). More strongly, Rutinwa (2001) maintained that the effect of 
splitting fi scal and actual responsibility between (rich) northern and (much 
poorer) southern countries would amount to a “global apartheid” (Chimni 
1998). In the end, both sides on the reformulation/pragmatist divide agreed 
that refugee protection ought to be provided to those who need it, yet there 
was substantial disagreement as to how, and especially at what cost, this 
was to be achieved. The 1998 Refugees Act attempts to steer a path between 
these confl icting views.
Interestingly, a similar message came through at the Workshop on 
Temporary Protection at the Seventh IRAP Conference in South Africa on 
7 January 2001. While the workshop focused largely on the operation of 
temporary protection in the European Union, it sought to clarify a number 
of issues concerning temporary protection generally, ranging from “defi ni-
tions and approach” to “complementary protection of nonrefugees.”
While there were no concrete conclusions to the vigorous discussions 
that took place in the workshop, what emerged was an almost completely 
polarized debate between essentially two positions. On the one hand, there 
were those who felt that the future of refugee protection depended on a 
“principled” recognition that states were generally reluctant to offer refugee 
status to persons and would only do so under circumstances where refugees 
received a time-limited protected status, one of their arguments being that 
if there was a “guarantee of quality, how would non-permanency offend?” 
On the other hand, there were those who resisted the imposition of tempo-
rary protection as a matter-of-course on the grounds that such a status was 
dangerously insecure and that it was pressuring states to repatriate. In their 
view, states’ reluctance to extend refugee protection to those who need it 
has long been a problem requiring constant vigilance and advocacy, and one 
that would not be resolved by a “political buy-in.”
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Containment: Proposed Reception Centers
Section 35(1) of the Refugees Act allows for the designation of “areas, centres 
or places” for the temporary reception of asylum-seekers or refugees in situ-
ations of “mass infl ux.” In 1999, the Department of Home Affairs released 
a “Discussion Document” to civil society organizations and UNHCR, pro-
posing the establishment of “Reception Centres,” where asylum-seekers 
would be required to stay while their applications for asylum were being 
processed (Department of Home Affairs 1999). This document was informed 
by a desire to “curtail rampant corruption, crime, and abuse, that have 
made the refugee program in South Africa a backdoor for illegal migration 
by persons seeking primarily economic betterment.” The government went 
on to say that “it is therefore understood that decisive measures should be 
taken, consistent with international refugee law and protection principles, 
to curb such abuse and restore the credibility of the institution of asylum” 
(Department of Home Affairs 1999:1).
Ostensibly, the proposal aims to reduce the “pull factors,” which alleg-
edly cause irregular migration to the country. This approach is consistent 
with the proposal in the White Paper on International Migration (Republic 
of South Africa 1999:4.2.1) that the government could “prevent illegal migra-
tion” by “reducing pull factors” through punitive measures, an approach 
described recently by a leading commentator as quite ineffective in stem-
ming the fl ow of irregular migration (Ghosh 1998).
The intention of the government was to get civil society organiza-
tions to endorse this proposal, with the view to have centers established in 
far-off, rural areas (van Garderen 1999b:14). Instead, the proposal has faced 
strong resistance, particularly from human rights organizations who feel 
that the project is not feasible, not least on economic grounds (van Gard-
eren 1999a:3). It is also felt that the establishment of centers would “have 
serious implications on some of the fundamental rights currently enjoyed 
by asylum-seekers.” From an administrative law point of view, the main 
contention against centers has been that the provision of the Act ought only 
to be used in circumstances of a sudden “mass infl ux” (van Garderen 1999a:
3) which, in the current situation, is clearly not the case.
Discussion Document, 1999
The Discussion Document requires that there be a “maximum delay of four 
months” (Department of Home Affairs 1999:4). However, as commentators 
have noted (Dutch Refugee Council 1997; van Garderen 1999a:3; Jenkins 
and de la Hunt 2000), the period of time in which one is normally confi ned 
to a reception center, which is dependent on the effi ciency of the asylum 
determination procedure, is very often longer. It is very common for asylum-
seekers to be in such centers for one year, or even longer, as it is inextricably 
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linked to (often lengthy) asylum procedures (Dutch Refugee Council 1997:
3). Freedom of movement concerns and fi nancial considerations aside, given 
the current state of the asylum determination procedure in South Africa 
(where decisions can take up to three years) it would not seem advisable 
(even in terms of the Department’s own, stated principles) to introduce 
reception centers.
Arbitrariness in the Decision-Making Process
As many commentators have noted, the asylum determination procedure in 
South Africa is characterized by a high degree of arbitrariness, which fails 
to achieve acceptable standards of administrative justice (Klaaren 1996; 
Handmaker 1999a:295; Klaaren and Sprigman 2000; Kerfoot 2000). Appli-
cations tend to be decided favorably with regard to the general conditions 
in certain countries perceived as “refugee generating,” or rejected on the 
grounds that conditions are perceived as “safe”—in other words on a “group” 
basis, rather than on individual assessment (van Beek 2001; Klaaren 2000). 
Indeed, eighty-fi ve percent of positive decisions on applications favor three 
countries, namely Angola, (former) Zaire, and Somalia, and only 141 applica-
tions out of 5,000 from Somalians have been rejected outright or declared 
manifestly unfounded as of April 2001. At the same time, the majority of 
rejected applicants have been from four countries: India, Senegal, Pakistan, 
and Nigeria.
Concerns over administrative justice have been central to the con-
cerns of a number of refugee groups and practitioners, who are fi rmly of 
the view that consideration of country situations in general provides more 
persuasive criteria in making determinations than the individual experi-
ences of asylum-seekers (Kerfoot 2000). While there have been few lawyers 
in South Africa able, let alone willing, to take up the cases of asylum appli-
cants who claim their rights have been infringed, the few cases which have 
reached the courts have established important precedents (Kerfoot 2000).
Other concerns over the procedure include: the interviewing process 
(including the absence of qualifi ed translators); inadequate access to coun-
try information; and the sheer lack of staff available to conduct interviews 
and make determinations. These are in most respects resource and training 
issues which urgently need to be corrected. However, the structure of the 
procedure itself causes serious problems, up to and including the appeals 
procedure. This is a policy question. In order to address this, two approaches 
toward asylum determination have been recommended. One approach, 
recommended by the Green Paper, argued for a “streamlined, one-step 
investigatory status determination procedure” (Republic of South Africa 
1997: 4.4.2), endorsed by those who favored a “reformulation” of refugee 
law. The other approach, endorsed by locally based organizations, favored a 
“hearings-based” determination procedure (Klaaren and Sprigman 2000). 
Ultimately, the Refugees Act adopted the latter, yet it remains to be seen 
how this will operate in practice.
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Refugees Amendment Bill 2001
The 1999 Discussion Document has since been superseded by a proposed 
Refugees Amendment Bill, released at the beginning of 2001 along with an 
explanatory “Memorandum.” The Bill aimed to do two things: fi rst to pro-
vide a legislative framework for the introduction of government-run Recep-
tion Centers for asylum-seekers in South Africa and, second, to introduce 
legal mechanisms for the purposes of restrictively interpreting the extension 
of refugee status in terms of the Refugee Act 1998.
It is abundantly clear that the amendments proposed by this Bill would 
not only fail to stand up to a constitutional challenge, but would violate 
fundamental principles of international law. Indeed, one of the restrictive 
mechanisms proposed, namely the Department of Home Affairs’ erstwhile 
policy of refusing admission to asylum applicants who passed through a 
purportedly “safe third country,” was recently (and successfully) challenged 
by way of a legal case taken up by Lawyers for Human Rights in May 2001.6 
Soon afterwards, the Minister of Home Affairs publicly called the Director 
General to task for “implementing a legally questionable asylum policy 
without his knowledge.”7
Thus, judging by recent events, the proposal to introduce reception 
centers for asylum-seekers in South Africa will at the very least be delayed 
for some time. It is hoped that South Africa will take due warning of the 
dreadful experience of compulsory detention of asylum-seekers in other 
countries and scrap the idea altogether, an idea which, in the opinion of 
two researchers who have comprehensively researched the subject, “would 
constitute the fourth successive trauma” experienced in South Africa (Jen-
kins and de la Hunt 2000:63).
Contradictions between Refugee and Migration Policy
The Draft White Paper on International Migration was released in April 
1999, nearly two years after the Green Paper was produced. It was followed 
in February 2000 by a Draft Immigration Bill. Even though the Green Paper 
specifi cally recommended separate White Papers for refugees and migra-
tion generally (Republic of South Africa 1997:1.5.7), and the White Paper 
indicated that it “would not deal with the issue of refugees” (Republic of 
South Africa 1999:3.3), it was clear that refugees would be affected by the 
migration policy, particularly the provisions on border control (Handmaker 
1999c:4).
The White Paper dwells at some length on the concept of the “commu-
nity,” though the term is not specifi cally defi ned. By implication, it appears 
to be a “citizen-based” concept, calling on South Africans to understand the 
distinction between different types of foreigners and tolerate, perhaps even 
to accommodate, but not integrate “noncommunity” members (Handmaker 
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1999c:4). Further, the White Paper calls on the “community” to assist in 
the enforcement of the country’s migration control systems, suggesting that 
one would be a “good citizen” by reporting anyone suspected of being with-
out legal residence to the authorities. In the words of the White Paper, the 
“community” would be “responsible for cooperating with internal policing 
actions to ensure that illegal immigrants are not attracted to South Africa” 
(Republic of South Africa 1999:4.4.1).
The White Paper drafters clearly anticipated that such administrative 
separation might cause some tensions, and thus further proposed that public 
education programs be undertaken on xenophobia. As the White Paper put it, 
one of the government’s priorities would be “ensuring that education is pro-
vided at community level to avoid any form of xenophobia by making com-
munities understand the tragedy of illegal immigration while co-operating 
with law enforcement authorities” (Republic of South Africa 1999:6.5).
Apart from the proven ineffectiveness of such punitive approaches to 
border control (Ghosh 1998:147), concerns over xenophobia are becoming 
ever more pressing. Refugees and other migrants in South Africa have, in 
recent years, been subject to multiple attacks on xenophobic grounds, some 
instances of which have received considerable attention (Human Rights 
Watch 1998).8 It is unlikely that this approach will do anything to stem the 
rise in xenophobia, particularly with regard to refugees who because of lin-
guistic, cultural, and other differences tend to be far more visible than other 
migrants. If anything, such an approach will split “communities” further 
and exacerbate the current levels of xenophobia, perhaps even leading to a 
new kind of “vigilantism” (Lawyers for Human Rights 1999:4).
A signifi cant criticism of the proposed policy and the Draft Immigra-
tion Bill was that it effectively brings refugee protection “back within the 
ambit of migration control,” rather than distinguishing between the two 
(Klaaren 2000). In the case of general border control issues this distinction 
is certainly important, yet of more limited direct consequence. In terms of 
the asylum determination regime and the migration regime, such a distinc-
tion is very important indeed. Both the White Paper and Immigration Bill 
delved further into issues specifi cally affecting refugees than they should 
have. The Bill even insists that it take “precedence” over the Refugees Act 
in the event of confl ict (Republic of South Africa 2000:Schedule 3).
In this regard, inconsistencies between the Refugees Act and the 
Immigration Bill become highly relevant. For example, the White Paper 
and the Immigration Bill both refer to “repatriation,” a term in international 
law with specifi c legal meaning attached to refugees (as opposed to migrants 
in general). Indeed, respected commentators have stressed that (voluntary) 
repatriation carries with it a responsibility on the part of the international 
community to fi nd solutions for refugees, while at the same time ensuring 
that the “interests of individuals and communities” are not disregarded 
(Goodwin-Gill 1996:271).
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Conclusion
Politicians in South Africa have been criticized for using the broader issue 
of migration for political gain (Human Rights Watch 1998:123). Whatever 
criticisms one might levy against the government, it cannot be denied that 
politicians face considerable policy hurdles, which have yet to be overcome, 
coupled with an administration that is currently incapable, both in terms of 
numbers and training, of handling the (gradually) rising number of asylum 
applications.
Migration policies that have their origins in the government’s attempts 
to exclude certain categories of persons will have little constructive effect 
in stemming the fl ow of migrants. Rather, an inclusive approach toward 
categories of persons whose skills are so urgently needed in South Africa, 
and a recognition of the “circular” nature of much contemporary migra-
tion, will go a long way toward redressing the negative trends of the Aliens 
Control Act, which have so often led to acrimony between civil society and 
government, rather than a constructive discussion of possible solutions.
With regard to refugees, it can be argued that differences of opinion 
and perspectives among various civil society commentators have played a 
role in stimulating the search for a practical, effi cient, yet rights-respecting 
determination procedure. There is nevertheless a real need for additional 
research. The principle of refugee protection is, as the government rightly 
states, derived from constitutional and international obligations. Indeed, 
this principle ought to ensure the integrity of refugee protection over and 
above considerations on migration in general. But there is a moral imperative 
as well, and distinguishing the justifi cation for a fair and rights-regarding 
procedure on the basis of “principle” rather than “goodwill” is diffi cult to 
sustain in the current global climate, when the need for protection from 
human rights violations is as urgent as it as ever been.9
NOTES
        1.     The Department of Home Affairs carries a great deal of “institutional baggage.” Previously, 
the Department was responsible for enforcing the notorious “pass laws” and “Group Areas 
Act,” key features of the previous government’s policy of apartheid.
       2.     Draft Refugee Affairs Appeal Board (Procedure) Rules 2000 are available at www.lhr.org.za/
refugee/appboard.htm
       3.     This situation, unfortunately, changed following the deliberations of the Green Paper Task 
Team. The policy debate was effectively “stalled” until May 1998.
       4.     The Reformulation of Refugee Law Project was funded by the Ford and MacArthur Founda-
tions and based for its duration at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Canada; 
see Hathaway (1997a, 1997b). Professor James Hathaway of York University was a consultant 
to the Green Paper Task Team.
       5.     The 1969 OAU Convention on the specifi c aspects of refugee problems in Africa provides a 
broader defi nition of a refugee, extending to situations “. . . owing to external aggression, 
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occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order” Art. I(2), 1000 
UNTS (United Nations Treaty Series) 46; South Africa acceded to this Convention on 15 
December 1995. This trend appears to be leading to the creation of a “white list” of countries. 
In the words of the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, “We will draw up a list of countries we 
recognize as democracies, and we expect that people from those countries won’t need to 
come to SA as refugees” Cape Times, 19 April 2000.
       6.     LHR v. Minister of Home Affairs, Case No.10783/2001, Pretoria Local Division.
        7.     Staff Reporter. Buthelezi accuses Masetlha. Business Day, 25 April 2001
       8.     One particularly publicized incident concerned the murders of three asylum-seekers on a 
train between Johannesburg and Pretoria. See: “Train from hell to Irene Station,” Pretoria 
News, 4 September 1998. Subsequent articles were critical of the public’s response, including 
“Public accused of being soft on mob killings,” Sunday Independent (SA), 6 September 1998. 
This incident was also reported in the international press, including the UK Independent on 
Sunday, “Xenophobic South Africa shrugs off train murders,” 13 September 1998.
        9.     On the day the Refugees Act was passed through South Africa’s parliament, the Deputy Min-
ister of Home Affairs made clear that: “When we give asylum to refugees, we do so because 
of our constitutional and international obligations. We do so as a matter of principle, not as 
matter of goodwill, and we are not doing anyone a favor” (Hansard, Proceedings of Extended 
Public Committee—Chamber of the National Assembly, 5 November 1998, at page 7751, 
South Africa.)
REFERENCES
Al-Omari, Ghaith. 1996. Comments on the South African Refugees Act 1994 (working draft). Unpub-
lished paper. Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford.
Bakewell, Oliver. 1998. Repatriation and Self-settled Refugees in Zambia: Bringing Solutions to the 
Wrong Problems. Paper presented at the 6th IRAP Conference, 13–16 December 1998.
Barutciski, Michael. 1998. The Development of Refugee Law and Policy in South Africa: A Com-
mentary on the 1997 Green Paper and 1998 White Paper/Draft Bill. International Journal of 
Refugee Law 10(4):700–24.
Chimni, B.S. 1998. The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South. Journal of Refugee 
Studies 11(4):350–74.
Crush, Jonathan, ed. 1998. Beyond Control: Immigration and Human Rights in a Democratic South Africa. 
Cape Town and Kingston: Idasa and Southern African Migration Project.
de la Hunt, Lee Anne. 1996. Comments on the Second Draft of the Refugees Bill. Unpublished paper. 
Cape Town: University of Cape Town Law Clinic.
 . 1998. Refugees and Immigration Law in South Africa. In Beyond Control: Immigration and 
Human Rights in a Democratic South Africa, edited by Jonathan Crush. Cape Town and Kings-
ton: Idasa and Southern African Migration Project.
Department of Home Affairs. 1999. Discussion Document on the Proposed Reception Centres for Asylum-
seekers in South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printer.
Dolan, Chris. 1995. Report to the Norwegian Refugee Council by the Wits Rural Facility Refugee Research 
Programme. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council.
Dutch Refugee Council. 1997. Asylum-Seekers — Don’t Let Them Just Sit and Wait. Amsterdam: Dutch 
Refugee Council and The Pharos Foundation.
africa
TO
D
A
Y
N
O
 E
A
S
Y
 W
A
LK
108
Geddo, Bruno. 2001. Durable Solutions to the Refugee Problem: UNHCR’S Regional Strategy for 
Southern Africa. In Perspectives on Refugee Protection in South Africa, edited by Jeff Hand-
maker, Lee Anne de la Hunt, and Jonathan Klaaren. Pretoria: Lawyers for Human Rights.
Ghosh, Bimal. 1998. Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores: Insights into Irregular Migration. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International.
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. 1996. The Refugee in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gordimer, Nadine. 1991. The Ultimate Safari. In Crimes of Conscience. London: Heinemann.
Handmaker, Jeff. 1997. Is It Safe to Return? West Africa 4154:967.
 . 1998. Refugees, Migrants, Immigrants and Policy Development: A Critical Look at the South 
African 1997 Draft Green Paper on International Migration. Unpublished paper. Pretoria: 
Lawyers for Human Rights.
 . 1999a. Who Determines Policy: Promoting the Right of Asylum in South Africa. International 
Journal of Refugee Law 11(2):290–309.
 . 1999b. Returning Home: Learning Lessons from the Past, and Promoting Safety and Dignity 
in Repatriation and Return. Africa Legal Aid Quarterly 3:19–27.
 . 1999c. Refugees and the “Community”: A Preliminary Review of the White Paper on Inter-
national Migration. Botshabelo 2(2).
Handmaker, Jeff, Lee Anne de la Hunt, and Jonathan Klaaren, eds. 2001. Perspectives on Refugee 
Protection in South Africa. Pretoria: Lawyers for Human Rights.
Handmaker, Jeff and James Schneider. 2002. The Status “Regularisation” Program for Former 
Mozambican Refugees (“FMRs”) in South Africa. Unpublished paper. Submitted for publica-
tion in February 2002.
Hathaway, James and Alexander Neve. 1996. Comments from the Perspective of International Refu-
gee Law. Unpublished paper. Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project.
Hathaway, James. 1997a. Making International Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and 
Solution-Oriented Protection. Harvard Human Rights Journal 10:115–211.
 , ed. 1997b. Reconceiving International Refugee Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
 . 2001. Temporary Protection of Refugees: Threat or Solution? In Perspectives on Refugee 
Protection in South Africa, edited by Jeff Handmaker, Lee Anne de la Hunt, and Jonathan 
Klaaren. Pretoria: Lawyers for Human Rights.
Human Rights Watch. 1998. “Prohibited Persons”: Abuse of Undocumented Migrants, Asylum-seekers, 
and Refugees in South Africa. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Jenkins, Frankie and Lee Anne de la Hunt. 2000. Detaining Asylum-seekers: Perspectives on Recep-
tion Centres for Asylum-seekers in South Africa. National Consortium on Refugee Affairs, 
South Africa, September.
Kerfoot, William. 2000. The Lack of Due Process in Asylum Determination in South Africa. Paper 
presented at Conference on Refugees in the New South Africa, Pretoria.
Klaaren, Jonathan. 1996. So Far Not So Good: An Analysis of Immigration Decisions under the Interim 
Constitution. South African Journal on Human Rights 12:605–616.
 . 1998. Immigration Law and the South African Constitution. In Beyond Control: Immigration 
and Human Rights in a Democratic South Africa, edited by Jonathan Crush. Cape Town and 
Kingston: Idasa and Southern African Migration Project.
 . 2000. Refugee Policy and Law in South Africa. Workshop on Forced Migrants in the New 
Millennium, University of Western Cape, Cape Town.
Klaaren, Jonathan and Chris Sprigman. 2000. Refugee Status Determination Procedures in South Afri-
can Law. Paper presented at Conference on Refugees in the New South Africa, Pretoria.
africa
TO
D
A
Y
JE
FF H
A
N
D
M
A
K
E
R
109
Koser, K., M. Walsh, and R. Black. 1998. Temporary Protection and the Assisted Return of Refugees 
from the European Union. International Journal of Refugee Law 10(3):444–61.
Lawyers for Human Rights. 1999. Comments on the White Paper on International Migration. Pretoria: 
Lawyers for Human Rights.
McNamara, Dennis and Kemal Morjane. 1996. Comments on South Africa Draft Refugees Bill. Unpub-
lished paper.
National Consortium on Refugee Affairs. 1998. Summary of Concerns of the National Consortium 
on Refugee Affairs (NCRA), Draft Refugees Bill 1998: Version Reviewed by the State Law 
Advisors. Unpublished paper.
Peberdy, Sally and Jonathan Crush. 1998. Rooted in Racism: The Origins of the Aliens Control Act. In 
Beyond Control: Immigration and Human Rights in a Democratic South Africa, edited by Jona-
than Crush. Cape Town and Kingston: Idasa and Southern African Migration Project.
Republic of South Africa. 1997. Green Paper on International Migration. Government Gazette 383
(18033). Notice 849 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printer.
 . 1998. Draft Refugee White Paper. Government Gazette 396(18988). Notice 1122 of 1998. 
Pretoria: Government Printer.
 . 1999. White Paper on International Migration. Government Gazette 416(19920). Notice 529 
of 1999. Pretoria: Government Printer.
 . 2000. Draft Immigration Bill. Government Gazette 416(20889). Notice 621 of 2000. Pretoria: 
Government Printer.
Rogge, John. 1994. Repatriation of Refugees. In When Refugees Go Home: African Experiences, edited 
by Tim Allen and Hubert Morsink. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press.
Rutinwa, Bonaventure. 1997. The Conceptual Basis and Practicability of the Chapter on Refugees in 
the South African Green Paper on International Migration. Unpublished paper.
 . 2001. Temporary Protection and its Expression under the “Reformulation of Refugee Law” 
Model. In Perspectives on Refugee Protection in South Africa, edited by Jeff Handmaker, Lee 
Anne de la Hunt, and Jonathan Klaaren. Pretoria: Lawyers for Human Rights.
Silove, Derrick. 1997. Anxiety, Depression and PTSD in Asylum-Seekers: Associations with Pre-Migra-
tion Trauma and Post-Migration Stressors. British Journal of Psychiatry 170(4):351–57.
South African Human Rights Commission. 1999. Report on the Apprehension and Detention of Sus-
pected Undocumented Migrants. Johannesburg: SAHRC.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 1997. Comments on Chapter 4 of the Draft Green 
Paper on International Migration. Unpublished paper. Pretoria: UNHCR.
van Beek, Ingrid. 2001. Prima Facie Asylum Determination in South Africa. In Perspectives on Refugee 
Protection in South Africa, edited by Jeff Handmaker, Lee Anne de la Hunt, and Jonathan 
Klaaren. Pretoria: Lawyers for Human Rights.
van Garderen, Jacob. 1999a. Editorial. Botshabelo 2(3):3.
 . 1999b. Introducing Reception Centers. Botshabelo 2(3):14.
Voutira, Eftihia. 1998. Refugee Integration in Receiving Countries: Lessons From the Past and Con-
temporary Challenges. Paper presented at Conference on Refugees in the New South Africa, 
Pretoria.
Wilson, K.B. and J. Nunes. 1994. Repatriation to Mozambique. In When Refugees Go Home: African 
Experiences, edited by Tim Allen and Hubert Morsink. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World 
Press.
africa
TO
D
A
Y
N
O
 E
A
S
Y
 W
A
LK
110
Table 1
Refugee Applications in South Africa, 1995–2001
Source Dated Received Approved Refused* Out-
standing
UNHCR May 1995 3,644 383 517 2,744
(State of the World’s Refugees)
DHA/UNHCR June 1996 16,967 1,915 5,649 9,403
(recorded fi gures)
DHA/UNHCR August 1997 32,510 4,002 6,118 22,390
(recorded fi gures)
DHA** November 1998 47,612 7,927 19,031 20,654
DHA/UNHCR June 1999 54,759 8,504 25,020 21,235
(recorded fi gures)
DHA/UNHCR April 2000 60,278 15,006 29,219 16,053
(recorded fi gures)
DHA/UNHCR April 2001 64,341 17,198 34,184 12,959
(recorded fi gures)
*Refused includes: Rejected, cancelled, referred, extended, withdrawn or manifestly
 unfounded applications.
**Speech by Deputy Minister of Home Affairs to Parliament, 5 November 1998.
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Table 2
Receipt of Refugee Applications by Country of Origin, to April 2001
  Country Number %
 1 Zaire/DRC 7,677 11.9
 2 Angola 6,859 10.7
 3 India 6,385 9.9
 4 Somalia 5,952 9.3
 5 Pakistan 5,336 8.3
 6 Nigeria 5,302 8.2
 7 Senegal 4,507 7.0
 8 Ethiopia 3,239 5.0
 9 Burundi 2,031 3.2
 10 Congo-Brazzaville 1,618 2.5
 11 Tanzania 1,473 2.3
 12 Bulgaria 1,441 2.2
 13 Ghana 1,400 2.2
 14 Bangladesh 1,310 2.0
 15 Rwanda 1,203 1.9
  Others 8,608 13.4
  Top 15 55,733 86.6
  TOTAL 64,341 100.0
Source: UNHCR/Department of Home Affairs.
Table 3
Rejected Applications, to April 2001
Country Number % Total % Applications
 1 India 5,625 17.5 88.1
 2 Nigeria 4,338 13.5 81.8
 3 Pakistan 4,174 13.0 78.2
 4 Senegal 3,686 11.4 81.8
 5 Ethiopia 1,934 6.0 59.7
 6 Angola 1,640 5.1 23.9
 7 Bulgaria 1,217 3.8 n/a
 8 Ghana 1,076 3.3 n/a
 9 Bangladesh 946 2.9 72.2
 10 Tanzania 868 2.7 58.9
  Others 6,695 20.8 n/a
  TOTAL 32,199 100.0 50.0
Source: UNHCR/Department of Home Affairs.
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Table 4
Approved Applications, to April 2001
  Country Number % Total % Applications
 1 Somalia 5,330 31.0 89.5
 2 Zaire/DRC 4,886 28.4 63.6
 3 Angola 4,471 26.0 65.2
 4 Burundi 941 5.8 46.3
 5 Congo-Brazzaville 661 3.8 40.9
 6 Rwanda 604 3.5 50.2
  Others 305 1.5 
  TOTAL 17,198 100.0 26.7
Source: UNHCR/Department of Home Affairs.
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Figure 1:  Applications Received to Date (1995-2001)
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